This is the final homework assignment for the course. it is due on the last day of class, Monday, May 5.

**Part 1:** Do the following exercises from Section 6.2: 6.2.8, 6.2.18, 6.2.25

**Part 2:** Do the following exercises from Section 10.4: 10.4.10, 10.4.11, 10.4.16

**Part 3:** For this part, consider the following table, which gives voter preferences
for an election among alternatives A, B, C, and D:

5 voters | 10 voters | 7 voters | 3 voters | |

First Choice | A | B | C | D |

Second Choice | C | D | D | A |

Third Choice | D | A | B | C |

Fourth Choice | B | C | A | B |

(a)
Which alternative wins using *plurality voting*? Why?

(b)
Which alternative wins using *plurality voting with runoff*? Show your work.

(c)
Which alternative wins using *IRV* (Instant Runoff Voting)? Show your work.

(d)
Which alternative wins using the *Borda Count*? Show your work.

(e) Determine the winner in each of the six possible one-on-one matches. Is there a Condorcet winner (that is, an alternative that wins every one-on-one match)?

(f) Suppose that D is eliminated from the election. Is there a Condorcet winner among A, B, and C? Why?

**Part 4:** Be in class on Monday to turn in your work.